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A Framework for Discussing SID-related Problems 
The purpose of these introductory comments is to set a framework for the 
examination of SID-related problems. 
In preparation for this task I examined the 1975 study conducted by 
CAUR.1 The first chapter contained an examination of alternatives to SID's. 
These alternatives were derived from a typology of development concepts based 
on: 1) who made the decisions about public improvements or development and 2) 
who financed them. 
If each of these dimensions are divided into public and private, then four 
types emerge: 1) where the decisions are made by the private sector and the 
financing is private, 2) where the decisions are private but the financing is 
public, 3) where the decisions are public and the financing is public, 4) 
where the decisions are public but the financing is private. (See Figure 
1.) These are ideal types and obviously mixing public and private within a 
variable is possible. Laissez-faire is the model for type I; the SID process 
at its height is an example of type II; governmental projects are examples of 
type III; and public regulation of the private sector is a mild example of 
type IV. 
Figure 1 
Types of Development Concepts 
Development Decisions About Financing of 
Concept Type Improvements are: Improvements is: 
I Private Private 
II Private Public 
III Public Public 
IV Public Private 
Keeping this model in mind may be useful because the SID concept is almost 
unique. Very few states have anything like it and only Nebraska uses it so 
2 
extensively. The Omaha metropolitan area might be different if SID's ceased 
to exist, but it would not be the end·of the world (or even the end of quality 
development in Omaha). 
I then examined a paper I presented to an academic group in 1978 entitled, 
:'The Bias of Decentralization! The Sanitary and Improvement District in 
Nebraska. "2 It repeated the framework just presented but also presented two 
others. 
The paper began by pointing out that all governmental structures (and 
actions) have some bias-i.e., they help some at the expense of others. It 
then suggested that one way of examining SID's was to answer the basic 
question of politics--who gets what, when, how (the title of a book by Harold 
Lasswell published 49 years ago).3 Who are the interests? What do they gain 
or lose? When? And how does it happen? I think if we keep asking ourselves 
who gains because of SID's and who loses because of them, we can add to the 
objective discussion of SID problems. Then each of you can make the value 
judgment of whether this is the way it ought to be. 
Permit me to flesh out the "who" and the "what" a bit further than was 
done in that earlier paper. Who are the interests involved in the SID 
process? The original conceptualization that led to the idea of this 
conference saw three major interests: 1) the developers and the "SID 
industry," 2) the cities that have zoning jurisdiction in the areas where 
SID's exist and/or are likely to annex the areas, and 3) the residents who 
live in the SID's. 
Further consideration, however, suggested these are not homogeneous 
interests. Developers may have interests that are not totally in congruence 
with the interests of the bond houses, the attorneys who specialize in SID's, 
the engineers who are hired to plan the infrastructure, the contractors hired 
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to construct it, or the investors who buy the bonds and warrants. 
Similarly, all cities are not alike. Omaha's interests vis a vis SID's 
may not be the same as Bellevue's and are even more likely to diverge from 
Papillion's or still smaller cities. 
In addition, conflict may occur within a city's governmental structure. 
The desires of the Planning Department may not be the same as those of the 
Finance Department. Elected officials (the City Council and, in Omaha, the 
Mayor) may not agree among themselves or may have different perceptions from 
the civil servants or appointed heads in the relevant departments. Both 
leaders and residents may speak in the name of the same entity (either a city 
or an SID) and yet have very different values and perceptions. 
Finally, SID's and their residents vary also. Some SID's (and residents) 
want to be annexed while others would like to remain independent and perhaps 
take on the additional responsibilities of general purpose governments. Some 
SID's are healthy while others are in financial trouble. Some are strictly 
residential while others may be totally commercial (or have a mixture of land 
uses). These differences mean that a single problem--or a single 
solution--will not fit everywhere. 
What can these interests gain or lose? Obviously, the costs and benefits 
can be economic--measurable in dollars. They may be direct economic costs, 
such as taxes to SID or city taxpayers. It may be direct economic benefits, 
such as profits to developers and others in the SID industry. Sometimes what 
is gained or lost, although measured in dollars, is an indirect impact of the 
SID process. For example, SID proponents argue that the process has resulted 
in cheaper housing while critics maintain that the process has resulted in 
higher property taxes. 
The gains and losses are not limited to outputs and impacts measured only 
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in economic terms (dollars). The outputs--the "whats"--may reflect other 
values. For example, both sides in an annexation conflict may ignore economic 
rationality and act on the basis of motivation to control their own 
destinies. This may reflect a desire to exercise power (or to resist others' 
power). The feeling of helplessness an SID board may have when it battles a 
city or well-organized interest group may influence its actions as much as 
economic factors. 
Status--as well as wealth and power--may be what is at stake, at times, in 
the SID process. Sometimes, as businessmen and public administrators know, a 
kind word or sympathetic.gesture can accomplish ·more than a direct order or an 
economic reward or punishment. Could some SID-eity conflicts be eased by the 
simple gesture of open communication? 
The second framework presented in that 1978 paper suggested a set of 
values by which to judge whether the SID concept is a good one. It put forth 
four values: 1) 
established to do? 
effectiveness--does the system accomplish what it was 
2) efficiency and economy--does it do this at minimum 
cost? 3) equity--how fair is the system?, and 4) citizen access and 
control--do the citizens control the decision-making process, or at least have 
access to the process? 
This set of values is not the only one, but it suggests some measuring 
sticks to be used when evaluating a proposed change in SID's--will it make 
them more effective, more economical, more equitable, or contribute to public 
control? 
Finally, I would like to offer one other variable to be kept in mind while 
wrestling with the problems of SID's. I believe thinking of the SID process 
with a time dimension in mind will be helpful. The SID process can be 
conceptualized as a life-process with four distinct stages. For example, the 
•' 
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SID law currently recognizes some stages, with election procedures changing 
after four years and again four years later. The first stage is the birth or 
formation of an SID. The second is infancy/childhood or the early stages of 
an SID's life (this could be expanded further into a development stage prior 
to any sales or residents and a later development or fill-in stage). The 
third is maturity and the fourth is death--either through annexation or 
dissolution. These stages of the SID process may help you think of problems. 
Obviously, these different perspectives can be combined into a single 
framework or matrix. For the sake of simplicity Figure 2 presents a matrix 
composed of a list of interests ("who") and a classification of gains and 
losses ("what") with a separate list of the stages of an SID's life ("when"). 
"Who" (interests) 
I. INDUSTRY 
Developers 
Bond houses 
Attorneys 
Engineers 
Contractors 
Investors 
II. CITIES/COUNTIES 
Specific governments 
{
Elected Officials 
Civil servents 
Citizens 
)Planning dcparoncnts 
'\Finance departmencs 
t(Other departments) 
Ill. SIDS 
{
Healthy 
Financially troubled 
{
Residential 
Mixed land use 
Commercial 
J Trustees 
)Residents 
FIGURE 2 
FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSING SID-RELATED PROBLEMS 
"What" ''When" 
Economic (wealth) Political (power) Social (status) "Birth" "Infancy/Childhood" "Maturity" 11 Death". 
Direct Indirect (formation) (development) (annexation/d iss~lu tion) 
Gain Loss Gain Loss Gain Loss Gain Loss 
"' 
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